1. INTRODUCTION 
Value of Information in Economic Models
ALTHOUGH THE VALUATION of information structures has been a topic of much concern in statistical decision theory, the economic literature devoted to this problem is fragmentary.* In this paper I will first review what is known about the efficacy of improving the quality of publicly disseminated information in models of general economic equilibrium. Particular attention will be paid to the relationship between the structure of markets-their timing and the nature of the contracts traded-and the sequential process through which information is r e~e a l e d .~ I will then consider a simple partial equilibrium model4 in which the relationship between the ordering of information structures in the decision-theoretic sense and their valuation to economic agents can be studied in more detail. The principal conclusions are that in a model with futures markets for unconditional delivery of the commodity, an improvement of the information structure in the decision theoretic sense generally will not coincide with a desirable change from the economic standpoint. Sufficient conditions for such a coincidence of rankings are given, but they are unlikely to be satisfied in practice. If options trading is allowed, and if there are only finitely many states of nature, then the two rankings will coincide except for rare, negligible, circumstances. But with a continuum of states of nature this result may not persist and there are some remaining open questions in this regard.
INFORMATION STRUCTURES
The uncertainty faced by a decision-maker is represented by his lack of knowledge of a parameter 8 E O. We assume that O is a finite set There are several ways of formalizing the concept of an information structure. The more usual one is to give a set of possible observations Y and m probability measures on Y ,.ni, i = 1 , . . . , m. The interpretation is that if 8, is the true state, then the observation is distributed according to T , .It is denoted ( Y ,T )for brevity.
The decision-maker's problem is to choose an action a E A so as to maximize the expected value of his utility The selection of a is made after y E Y is observed, so the relevant expectation for each y is the posterior belief. This depends on the prior probabilities according to Bayes theorem:
The attained level of expected utility, viewed ex ante, depends upon u, r, and the information structure (
Y ,T ) .It is denoted U ( u ,r, ( Y ,T ) ) .Information structures are partially ordered by the criterion that ( Y ,

@ ( Y ' , T ' ) if and only if (2.1) U ( u ,r, ( Y ,T ) )3 U ( u ,r, ( Y ' , T ' ) )
for all u and all r > O .
Blackwell's theorem provides a set of alternative, equivalent, comparisons of information structures that are simpler to check than (2.1). Let This theorem has two principal implications for our purposes. First, (2.1) has been converted into a constructive criterion involving linear inequalities (because h l l~3 0 is required), and is therefore easier to verify. Second, this criterion is independent of the prior, r. For any fixed r >0, the ranking induced by (2.3) U(u, r, (Y, T)) 3 U(u, r, (Y', T')) for all u will be identical with @ .
When the prior is fixed, there is an alternative formalization of an information structure. This is the one that will be utilized below. An information structure (for (0, r)), (X, p, Y), is a set X, a measure p on O X Xand a partition 9 of X. A generic subset of X is denoted S. The marginal distribution of p on O is constrained to be r. The interpretation is that X is a set of potential observations, x, that are statistically related to 8 as described by p . However, these best possible observations are not actually received; only the set S E Y is perceived and can be used to condition the choice of an action.
Clearly any (Y, T) can be reformulated as ( X ,Y, p ) and vice versa. However, to compare (Y, T) and (Y', T') in the formulation (2.1) it is necessary to utilize the same set X and measure p.
It has been shown (Green and Stokey Throughout this paper we deal ,with information structures specified as (X, p, Y ) , and we consider comparisons of partitions (partially) ordered by refinement. By virtue of the theorem just cited we can interpret results applicable to any pair of partitions ordered by refinement as being valid for any information structures ordered by Blackwell's criterion.
IMPROVING INFORMATION, STATISTICAL DECISION THEORY, A N D ECONOMIC MODELS O F EQUILIBRIUM
In statistical decision theory a decision problem is given by a set of possible actions A and a utility function u: O x A -+ R. The value of the problem v(u, Y, p ) is given by Ess/ maxasAEH S~ ( 8 , a) . Obviously the value of a problem increases when Y is refined.
In economic models there are two additional buyers of complexity. Both arise from the interaction between the endogenous variables determined by the model and the economic environment. First, the set of feasible actions may be a function of endogenous variables, as for example is the budget set of a consumer dependent on prices. Second, the actual payoff may depend on these endogenous variables as well as on 8 and a. Fluctuations in the value of long-term financial assets is an example.
We will consider the case of identical prior beliefs and information across agents. All agents' posterior beliefs, given S, are given by the mapping A ( . IS) defined by:
Let it be the set of all probability vectors. A decision structure 4 = (4*, d C / ) is the formal description of the dependence of an economic agent's decision problem on the common posterior. It is specified by the pair of functions:
where OU is the space of all utility functions and .dis the space of all subsets of A. The value of an information structure depends upon the decision structure to which it is applied. Let V ( 4 ,u, 9, p ) be given by ES max
I(@, a ) .
EBIS&U(A a s l a ( A ( . l S ) )
It is easy to see that, for some 4, V 
VALUE O F INFORMATION IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS
Before turning to the analysis of a particular partial equilibrium model which will be the main focus of our attention, we pause to survey the current state of the problem in general equilibrium models. This will place the later analysis in the proper perspective. One or two of the results of this section may be new, but most are well known.
The value of improving the information structure in A general equilibrium system depends on two principal factors: the timing of markets compared with the timing of the informational structure, and the presence or absence of a complete system of futures markets for contingent trade.
We discuss the case of pure exchange and consider only information structures and priors that are the same for all agents. Individuals are denoted i = 1,.. . ,I;
their endowments are w i ( 8 ) ;their trades are ti; and their consumptions are ti= wi +ti. Utility will be assumed to be state independent and given by the von Neumann-Morgenstern representation u i ( t ) .Some of our results will depend on this restriction, but since it will be maintained in the partial equilibrium model of Sections 5-7 we have assumed it here in order to make the analyses more readily comparable.
A. Complete markets for trade conditional on ( S , 8 ) held before information is revealed, with consumption only after 8 is reuealed.
In this case, it is well known that trade dependent on S would be irrelevant and a Pareto optimal resource allocation would be attained with trade conditioned only on 8. The information structure therefore has no bearing on the allocation of resources. ( S , 8 ) held before information is revealed, with consumption at both the date information is revealed and when 8 is reuealed.
B. Complete markets for trade conditional on
In this model the state 0 is revealed in two stages. The information structure Y serves to limit the set of possible states that can occur with positive probability.
That is {supp A ( . IS)}SEYis a partition of O. We denote this partition by 9.
From the work of Radner [19] we know that the equilibrium of this system is Pareto efficient among all allocations restricted to be measurable with respect to 9
at the information date. Clearly, therefore, a refinement of the information structure expands the feasible set and cannot be detrimental to all agents at the new equilibrium. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that every agent is made better off at the equilibrium with better information than at the original one. 9 held after the revelation of S. Consumption only after 8 is revealed.
C. Complete markets for trade conditional on
Here, the price system depends on the set S. Unlike the case in which markets meet before S is revealed, there is the potential for information to be harmful. (This has been pointed out in Hirschleifer [ 6 ]but to my knowledge the precise general statement has not been given previously, nor has it been emphasized that the case of "no information" has some special properties.) The allowable trades must be measurable with respect to a partition, &, of O which is coarser than the partition of O into one-element sets. In such a system the equilibrium is known to be Pareto optimal relative to the set of all allocations which are &-measurable. However, after 8 is revealed and trades are consummated, there is a further incentive to trade and markets would reopen if it is feasible to do so. If such a reopening of markets is perceived ex ante the initial equilibrium would be disturbed because of speculative motives, and the presumption of its optimality is no longer valid. A temporary equilibrium theory would have to be developed along the lines of Green [lo]to admit the possibility of speculative trading.
E. Incomplete market after information is revealed, with consumption only after 8 is revealed.
In this case the argument of Section C breaks down because 6, (S, 8 ) 
F. Incomplete markets both before and after information is revealed, with consumption only after 8 is revealed.
Because the randomness of the price system might cause detrimental effects on individuals' welfare compared to a stable price system, there would be an incentive to trade before the information is announced. With complete markets for trade conditional on 8 and trade prior to information we would have a market structure such as in A above; and as noted there, the information structure would be irrelevant to allocation and the markets held after the information is revealed would become vestigial. With incomplete markets, however, an incentive to revise trades made prior to the information would be present. Both rounds of trading would be active unless some form of impediment precluded them.
Speculative motives in the prior round of trading would determine the allocation achieved. The welfare analysis of such a system with sequential, incomplete, futures markets is highly complex and it is doubtful that general results could be obtained. Nevertheless this market structure is in some sense the most natural (inevitable?) when a complete contingent claims market cannot be established. It is, indeed, a representation of reality in many markets-for example bonds, foreign exchange, and commodity futures trading. The partial equilibrium analysis that follows is therefore based on this structure: trade, both before and after information is revealed, for a commodity to be delivered independent of the state of nature that is realized.
. A PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
A. Market Structure and Informational Conditions
We consider a partial equilibrium model involving a single commodity. The production and demand conditions are uncertain. Although there are many producers whose output levels are jointly distributed random variables, we will consider the welfare of only one producer. His decisions about productive inputs are assumed to be taken prior to the events and activities described in this model, and moreover are assumed to be nonresponsive to changes in his economic environment. The analysis is concerned exclusively with the way in which the market and the information structures interact and enable this producer to reduce the risk he faces.
The producer is assumed to have no residual demand for his output. His behavior is governed by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function defined over the level of his final wealth. This wealth is the sum of the value of his output plus any profits or losses he has made by trading futures contracts.
The nature of informational considerations in this model is as follows: When the underlying uncertainties of production and demand have been resolved, there is a final spot market on which the available output is traded. The equilibrium price is denoted p. The product of p with the producer's realized level of output is the value of his output and is denoted by v. Since p and u are both functions of the underlying state of nature, O E O, whose distribution is exogenous, they are regarded by the producer as jointly distributed random variables. We will sometimes write p(0) and u(0) explicitly to emphasize this dependence, but usually the parameter 0 is suppressed without fear of confusion.
At some time before the uncertainty is resolved there is an observation, S E 9, received in common by all the economic agents in the system, that is related to the state of nature in a statistical sense, as described in Section 2.
Let us now consider the structure of futures markets. Throughout this study a futures contract is a contract for (uncontingent) delivery of the commodity at a specified price. This price is the equilibrium price of such a contract at the date the futures market is open, which may be either before or after S is revealed, as described in Section 4.
The market before S is revealed is called the prior market, and the market after S is revealed is called the intermediate market-to indicate that it comes between the information and the resolution of the uncertainty. Alternative market structures consist of specifying whether either, or both, of these futures markets are allowed to be active.
Holding the structure of the futures markets fixed, we ask whether an improvement in the quality of the information structure, in the sense of Section 2, necessarily increases the producer's expected utility. In particular we show that the value of any information structure compared to "no information" is always positive when both prior and intermediate markets are operative, although it may be negative when there is only an intermediate market. 6 However, improving an existing information structure does not in general lead to a higher expected utility. Sufficient conditions to insure "monotonicity" of the producer's expected utility in the quality of the information are given, but they are very restrictive in nature.
B. Futures Markets Equilibration
The issues above can best be approached under a simplified assumption regarding the equilibration of future markets.
ASSUMPTION: Every futures market equilibrates at a price equal to the conditional mean price on the final spot market, given the information available.
That is, if we are considering a futures market before the information is revealed, then p 0 = E,p is the equilibrium price. If the observation S has already been received, then p l ( s ) = EBlspis the equilibrium. This assumption is justified if there are risk neutral arbitrageurs or if this market is small and independent of other risks in the economy.
The von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is denoted u, and the agent's final wealth is denoted w.
If a futures contract is purchased, the profit from holding it to the final date is the difference between the price on the spot market and the futures price.
Let z" be the purchases on prior futures market, held until the intermediate futures market and then sold. Let z l ( s ) be the purchases on the futures market after information, S, has been observed.
If both types of futures markets are operative, the individual's decision consists of a choice of z nand a planned choice of z l ( s ) for every S E 9. This strategy leads to final wealth
For an example in which this occurs, see Green 1121.
The joint distribution of (6,x ) , together with 9and the functions p ( 6 ) and v ( 6 ) Just as in Section 4F we see that, given an information structure, the agent can only gain from the existence of an opportunity to trade on futures markets at both the prior and intermediate dates. In the absence of a prior market he is effectively restricted to choose z 0 = 0, and without an intermediate market he must take z 0 = z l ( s )= z for some z. Since any restriction on the class of attainable random payoffs w can only be harmful, all agents would prefer to have both rounds of trading available.
A. Is Some Information Better Than None P
In Green [12] it was shown that with only an intermediate market, a given information structure may or may not be superior to no information at all. The reason is that in improving the information structure the system of prices at which the agent can trade on the intermediate market, { p l ( s ) ; S 6 Y}becomes more variable with respect to S. This variability may more than offset the direct beneficial effect of superior information that allows the individual to make better use of the futures markets to mitigate risk. In the present paper we explore whether the presence of a prior market on which the price is necessarily independent of the information may enable the agent to offset this price fluctuation.
It is easy to see that any information structure allows the agenr to achieve at least the expected utility attainable under no information, when both rounds of trading are active. Without information the prior and intermediate rounds of trading are really the same, that is, p ( S ) Let the level of contracts held after the intermediate round be z l . To achieve the same distribution of final wealth in a system with information the agent could always choose z 0 = z l ( s )= z l , for all S. Thus, information can only be beneficial, vis a vis a "no information" situation.
B. Is A n y Improvement in the Information Structure Beneficial?
A Positive Example
The situation becomes more complex when we consider improvements of an existing information structure that is already better than "no information." To approach this problem we proceed via an example. 
C =
That is, we have identified p and z !with the first and second factor spaces of 0 and can then consider them directly as the underlying random variables.
The mean of this distribution can be taken to be (0,0,0) without loss of generality, for the following reasons: The price, p, is only relevant relative to its deviation from the mean, and thus it can be translated to have mean zero. The scaling of s is arbitrary; all that is really relevant are the conditional joint distributions of (p, c ) for each s.
As far as c is concerned, it will soon become clear that any policy (zo, ( z l ( s ) ) results in a payoff having a normal distribution, or a mixture of normal distributions, with mean Ec. In such a situation, every risk-averter would want to minimize the variance of the payoff and would choose the same policy. Thus Ec can be normalized to zero.
This point bears a bit more emphasis since it is primarily responsible for the simplicity of the results in this example. Risk averters may have diverse attitudes towards the tradeoff between risk and return. Such an agent whose mean wealth changes, generally will have a different preference over risky assets as a result. However, the special feature of this model is that all policies affect the distribution of returns but not the mean. Therefore the optimal zl(s) must be such as to minimize the variance of u + zl(s)(p -pl(s)) for every s, no matter what value of z0 was selected, because the return zO(p'(s)-pO) is nonstochastic at the date when the trade zl(s) is executed.
Because of this property, zl(s) depends only on the conditional variancecovariance matrix of t. and p -pl(s) which is given by Note that this is independent of s, a property of the joint normality assumption. Therefore zl(s) is in fact independent of s and is given by To minimize the overall variance of w, one can compute directly that the optimal trade in the prior market is
The variance of the optimum random payoff is First let us note that the formula for the variance at the optimum (6.5) is consistent with the result that no information is always dominated by some information. The absence of information in this example is equivalent to a,, = co, since this implies that any observation s is associated with a conditional distribution of (p, u) that is identical to its unconditional distribution. Setting a,, = oo,(6.5) becomes and it can be computed directly from (6.5) and (6.6) that the variance of the payoff is reduced when a,, is finite.
More generally, the derivative of (6.5)with respect to as,can be shown to be always positive. Thus an improvement in the quality of information that consists of reducing the variance of s is necessarily beneficial.' Not all imprcvements in the initial structure of information can be represented in this way. However, any improvement with the property that the posterior distribution of (p, v) was a bivariate normal with conditional variance-covariance matrix independent of S can be represented as a refinement of an original partition on O x X if suitably large X space were chosen.
Although it has been shown that a class of improvements of the information structure are beneficial, it has not been demonstrated that an arbitrary refinement will be beneficial.
C. A Negative Example
In the example above we saw that the sequential market structure enabled the producer to obtain the benefits of superior information in the intermediate market, due to a higher conditional correlation between p and u, while mitigating the increased risks of induced price fluctuations by taking an appropriate position in the prior market. This positive result depends on several special features of the normal distribution. To illustrate, and to prepare the ground for the theorem of the next section, we present another example.
'When a,, is decreased the underlying space X can be reinterpreted as IW2 and g can be thought of as a jointly normal distribution over IW4. Then the coarser information structure is the set of cylinder sets over the first component of X and the better one is the partition of X into one-element sets.
This example has the striking characteristic that the improvement in the information structure will be detrimental to the utility of every risk averter. Under any criterion it will be ranked below the coarser structure.
Let O and X consist of three discrete points each:
The variables p and v depend on 8 
according to o p v
The underlying joint distribution of (8, x) is given by the entries in the following table:
We consider two information structures Y and Y' given by Clearly Y is a refinement of 9'.
Under either information structure, the prior market equilibrium is given by
The conditional mean prices which are the equilibrium prices on the intermediate market are given by (6.8) pl(sl) = la, p1(s2)= I:, p1(s3)= 4t, and Consider the following strategy which can be followed under the poorer information structure, 9":
Using the definition of the payoff this results in a perfectly certain level of final wealth, w, given by w = l$. Since all strategies available to the producer are associated with the same mean return, it is clear that all risk averters would choose the strategy above under the information structure Y'.
To show that Y is unambiguously worse than Y' for all risk averters, it suffices to demonstrate that there is no strategy that can achieve this riskless payoff. Consider the three points in O XY', all of which have a positive probability of occurrence, (81, S:), (02, S:), (63, S3).If we are to achieve a payoff of 13under all of these circumstances we must have ( From (6.12)iiii) we see that z O = -$ and this plainly contradicts (6.12)ii) and (6.12)(ii). This confirms that the effect of improving the information structure on the expected utility of any risk averter would be harmful.
6.11) (i) I$= t.(81)+z o ( p 1 (~~) -p 0 ) +~' (~~) ( p ( 6~) -p 1 (~: ) ) , (iif l$=v ( 8~) + z~( p~i~2 ) -p~) + z~~~: ) ( p ( 9 2 ) -p~(~2 ) ) ,
D. A Suficiency Theorem
We now present a theorem which will cast more light on the differences between the two examples of the preceding section. The conditions of the theorem are extremely restrictive. This is indicative of the limited class of cases under which the ordering of information structures by the criterion of refinement, appropriate for the context of statistical decision theory, coincides with the improvement of expected utility for all risk averters in the present economic model.
THFOREM: Let Y be a refinement of Y' and let u = -e-""', y >0. Then the following conditions irnply that the agent will prefer Y to Y':
EBlsu @EBISp for all S E 9 ;
(iii) the distribution of (t; -Esis,c, p -EBlsfp) conditional on Sfis independent of S' E Y. Note also that the assumptions (i), (ii), and (iii) hold in the case of joint normality and fail in the negative example of the previous section. The restriction to constant absolute risk aversion utilities is not needed in the case of normality, because all risk averters will choose the distribution with the lowest variance. This implies that their trades in the intermediate market will be independent of the realization of S. Without constant absolute risk aversion, these trades will vary and it is their constancy which turns out to be crucial to the result.
PROOF:We first observe that the optimal decision under the information structure Y', (zO', rl'(s')) is such that zl'(s') is independent of S'E9". To see this, note that for any zO' E R, the problem that would be faced at the intermediate date given S' is max Eels,exp (-(u +zl'(s')(p -pl(s')) +zO'(pl(~') -pol). which, by virtue of (iii), is the same problem for each value of S' E Y'. Let us denote the common value of the z 1 (St)by z l .
The second observation is that p = P' and Po= Pb are necessarily satisfied because of the linearity conditions (i) and (ii) and the fact that Y refines Y'. We will write their common values as p and Po,without fear of confusion.
We now proceed to the main part of the proof, which is to show first that the optimal prior trades are z U = -0, and then that the sequential trades (zO, 2'') under the information structure Y' are dominated, for all risk averters, by the same sequence of trades when Y is the information structure.
Let us fix S' E Y and consider the collection 7= {SE YIS G S').
The payoff attained under Y' if S' is observed and 0 is the realized state of nature is and when Y is the information structure, S E 7is observed and 0 is realized, the payoff is Given that S' is observed, (6.13 ) is a random variable that depends only on 8, whereas (6.14) depends on which S E Y is observed as well. Nevertheless we will consider both payoffs as they depend on S and 8, regarding S and 8 as jointly distributed random variables whose distribution is conditional on S'. We rewrite the payoffs (6.13) and (6.14) as the outcome of a two stage lottery in which, given S', first S c S' is realized and then 0 is realized. Expression (6.13) can be written as
The first bracketed expression is the mean payoff given S, and the second represents the deviation around that mean realized in the second stage of the two stage lottery. Similarly (6.14) can be rewritten with the same interpretation of the two terms. Note that the second parts of (6.15) and (6.16) are identical. Let us therefore consider the first parts, substituting in the linearity conditions (i) and (ii). From (6.15) we have (6.17) ip
In ( The use of constant absolute risk aversion in this theorem is somewhat hidden and we pause briefly to comment upon it. It is important at only one point, but there it is rather crucial. If we did not have constant absolute risk aversion, the. optimum under 9' might correspond to a policy for which the conditional means, are not identical over all S ' EY'. Then, under the refined partition 9, the conditional means obtained by choosing the same z O would be dispersed even further. Moreover, there might be no choice of z 0 that would make the conditional means, given S E Sip', equal to that attained at s'. ' Another point should be made before leaving the discussion of this theorem.
We showed that the same action plan that was optimal in the case of Y' would ' A counterexample to this effect is available from the author. It is omitted here in the interest of conserving space, as it is quite lengthy.
achieve superior results when Y is the information structure. Actually, although the actions are described the same way, they result in different payoffs as a function of 13 because the intermediate prices are d i f f e r e~~t .~ This is properly viewed in the context of Section 2 as a case where the information structure changes the attainable utility level because of induced changes in the endogenous variables. The beneficial effect does not run through its "informativeness" per se. There may, however, be further beneficial effects in this direction if the optimum under Y is not the dominating strategy (zO', z l ' ) that was used in the proof.
VALUE OF INFORMATION IN THE PRESENCE OF OPTIONS MARKETS
The restrictive character of the theorem of the last section derives from the fact that the market structure we have considered imposes constraints on the way in which the producer can hedge his risks. Since all contracts specify delivery unconditionally at' the terminal date, the profit or loss from holding futures contracts is necessarily a linear function of the final spot price and the conditional mean prices. The more complex patterns of profit that would allow a better approximation to a constant payoff require a different kind of contract. A natural candidate is the class of options.
An option is a contract that entitles the holder to buy or sell something at a future date, at his own discretion, at a prespecified price called the striking price. In the model we have considered there are four types of options markets, differing according to the date at which they equilibrate and the item to which the option represents a potential claim:
Type I: option tor the commodity, traded at the intermediate date.
Type 11: option for the commodity, traded at the prior date. Type 111: option for a contract (for unconditional delivery) on the intermediate market, traded at the prior date.
Type IV: (when type I options exist) an option for an option of type I deliverable at the intermediate date, traded at the prior date.
We will assume that if a type of options market exists, it is active at all striking prices and for rights to both purchase and sell. We maintain throughout the basic assumption that the equilibrium price of any contract is equal to its actuarialy fair value. Note that an unconditional contract of the type considered in the previous sections can be viewed as the right to buy at the zero striking price, or to sell at a striking price that is almost surely above the final spot price. (If the final spot price cannot be bounded above with probability one, then such options to sell can only approximate the sale of a contract for sure future delivery.) Because of this, it suffices to think of the market structure as consisting of options contracts only.
The basic results of this section can be summarized by the statement that if there are options markets in place of unconditional futures markets at each of the two trading dates, then an improvement in the information structure can never be Note also that the random variable attainable under .4P' might not be the result of any strategy under .Y. See the discussion above under "Remarlis on Proof." detrimental. Two points should be noted: First, options markets provide far less opportunity for mitigating risks than would a full system of contingent contracts. Trades can be conditioned on the realization of p ( . ) to some extent, but not on v ( . ). For example, whatever options contracts are held, it will always be true that the net profit from trade depends only on x and p ; for a fixed x there may be two points el and O2 in O where p(O1)=p(e2)but ~( 8~) and is very different from v(O2), final wealth would necessarily be unequal in those cases. Second, the market structure with options contracts shares with the unconditional futures market system the property that prices at the intermediate date depend on the structure of information. Nevertheless, the proof of the basic result mentioned above will proceed by showing that, under some very mild conditions, the feasible set of payoff distributions is actually expanded by an improvement in information.
Let us examine the set of feasible payoff patterns in more detail. To do so, we need to know the profit or loss potentially available from trading each kind of option at each striking price. The prices of each of the four option contracts depend on whether it is a contract to buy or to sell, on the striking price and, for type I options, which are the only ones traded at the intermediate date, on the realized set S E Y.
These prices are given as follows:
where + indicates an option to buy, -an option to sell, q is the striking price, and S is the observed event.
Type 11:
Type 1 1 1:
Type I V :
is the price of an option to buy at the price q, an option to buy at the intermediate date with striking price q'. Other buylsell permutations within type IV can be handled similarly. Note that, just as the existence of options of type I1 at all striking prices removes the necessity for a separate treatment of unconditional trading at the prior date, the presence of options of type IV removes the relevance of those of type 111.
We will now study how these options contracts can be used to mitigate the risks facing the agent. It will be useful to introduce the notion of a profitpattern which is a function that gives the profit (or loss) obtained by the chosen combination of future contracts, as a function of the actual (8, x) that is realized. We will describe the set of profit patterns that are attainable by givingsome necessary conditions that they must satisfy and then showing that any profit pattern compatible with these requirements can in fact be realized by options trading.
An options trading plan is a description of the actions taken at the initial date, and the actions planned at the intermediate date depending on the available information. We will consider two types of market structures. Either type I1 or type 111 options will be traded at the initial date. Type I options will be traded at the intermediate date. We will neglect type IV options, although it will be seen that in fact they are not necessary.
An options trading plan must specify the net trade of each type of option at each striking price. Because the striking price is a continuous variable (there is a continuum of contracts) the appropriate way to deal with this spectrum of trading possibilities is to define signed measures over the real line, which give the "density" of contracts traded at various striking prices. for each S E 9, the interpretation being that these are the trades to be executed when S is realized. Notice that the options of type I1 are in fact effectively converted into options of type I at the intermediate date. We adopt the convention that ::, s, z!,~ are the total amounts of type I options held after trading at that time.
In summary, an options trading plan is given by a vector of signed measures when options of type I and I1 constitute the market structure. When the market structure is types I and 111, then we have with the same interpretation. Note that the definition of type 111 options causes them to yield a definitive return at the intermediate date rather than converting them into a type I option. Thus it is appropriate to view z'cXs, z!,~ as actual net purchases at the intermediate date. This will become clear shortly when the reckoning of net profits is described.
Because of the conventions adopted above, each of the types of options contracts can be viewed as a single-period security. That is, the value of type I 1 and I11 options are determined at the intermediate date according to the realization of S and the value of type I contracts are determined at the final date according to the realization of p.
For type I these values are given by where w f, , is the value of a contract to buy at a striking price of q. We shall not, in fact, need the explicit expressions for type IV's valuations at the intermediate date.
We can compute the net profit from holding a unit of each type of options contract by simply taking the difference between its price (ex ante), given in (7.1)-(7.3)and its value ex post, given by (7.5)-(7.7).
Thus we have, for example in type I , as the net profit resulting on an option to buy the commodity, at a striking price q, executed after S is observed when 0 is realized. For type I 1 we have a net profit that depends on the realized value of S, for example and for type I11 we have, for example,
We now come to a statement of some necessary conditions to be fulfilled by a feasible profit pattern. Whether the market structure is I and I11 or I and 11, it is clear from (7.8)-(7.10) that the profit pattern 77 (0,x ) can be decomposed into the profit from trading contracts on the prior market ( I 1 or 111) and those from the trading plan in the intermediate market ( I ) . The former depend on x, but only through the realized S. The latter depend on S and 0, but for each S they vary only with the value of p ( . ) . Therefore feasible profit patterns satisfy the necessary condition that can be approximated to any degree of accuracy by measures z + , z -concentrated on finitely many points, and their weak limit, which may be non-atomic, will attain the desired qs pattern.
To complete the construction of q we need to achieve q ( 8 ,x)-7 7~as the payoff to the holdings of type I options contracts given the realization of S. Since E R sq(O, X ) -qs = 0 by construction, this amounts to showing that any actuarily fair payoff that varies only with p and is continuous in that variable can be attained by a combination of type I options. As in the case of type I11 above, we see from (7.8)that type I options have payoffs that are constant on some half-line and linear in p(8) on the complementary half-line. Finite weighted combinations allow arbitrary continuous piecewise linear functions, and any continuous function can be reached by a limiting procedure.
Q.E.D.
The pioneering paper by Ross [21] shows that the conditions of this theorem are likely to be true in general, and that the complete markets outcome could be expected in the presence of options, even though trades can be made only uncontingently. Ross's theorem applies only to the case of a finite set of states and observations, which might not be a good approximation to a more complex reality.
In some cases when Yis a partition with an infinite set of elements and when O is multidimensional, the hypothesis that {E,lsp (8) )sEy is a set of distinct numbers will not be valid. The following theorem applies to this situation. (6) is the same, the hypothesis that the means be distinct can be weakened to the statement that the distributions be distinct.
These theorems provide us with the principle conclusion of this section.
THEOREM: Let the set of attainable profit patterns be characterized by (7.11)- However, when Y has a continuum of elements, for example when it consists of cylinder sets over points in a subspace of a high dimensional Euclidean space, the condition needed in the first theorem of this section is surely not satisfied. Even the weaker condition of the second theorem may not hold, although this is still an open question. Nevertheless it may be hoped that, although these conditions can be violated for some pairs of elements in the partition 9,the set of such pairs is sufficiently "thin" in Y x Y that the conclusion is still generically valid. We hope to approach this question in future work.
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